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Close year-by-year study of an industrial plant re
vealed one glaring oversight in its planning; by tak
ing too long a time span for many of its calculations,
the company was, in effect, masking a sharp drop in
productivity —
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ning capabilites should enable
comprehension of the full effects
of financial interrelationships, op
erating characteristics, and govern
ing management policies. In this
regard, many companies have uti
lized computers to provide an im
proved planning capability and, in
particular, the development of fi
nancial planning models.
Building a financial planning
model involves extensive use of
historical data and past perform
ance. The specific format or logic
of the interrelationships contained
in a model will more than likely
be based on an evaluation of such
relationships in prior years of a
company’s operations. The para23

Addition of workers to a raw material processing area resulted in an actual decrease in productivity . . .

meters of these relationships are
generally established from corre
lation studies and similar statisti
cal analyses.
The heavy reliance on historical
performance and related data as a
basis for building a financial plan
ning model and for supporting as
sumed effects of alternative man
agement actions in the future, sug
gests the need for a clearer under
standing and evaluation of what
truly constitutes past performance.
While the accounting and man
agement information systems of a
company may provide an identifi
cation of financial and operating
problems on a relatively shortrange basis, there is limited capa
bility in most organizations to

identify and isolate the trends in
productivity which have a cumula
tive impact on profitability. Rich
ard Gerstenberg, chairman of the
Board of General Motors Corpora
tion, stated, “I regard productivity
as a measure of management’s ef
ficiency, or lack of efficiency, in
employing all the necessary re
sources—natural, human, and finan
cial.” If this measure is not used
to diagnose the gradual forces af
fecting performance—good or bad
—then the reliance on historical in
formation as a basis for developing
a financial model poses risks of per
petuating capital and human pro
ductivity in the future which may
be well out of line with maintain
able levels.

Elaboration of this real danger
is illustrated by the following case
example.
A case example

The company represented by
this example produces consumer
non-durable products in a con
tinuous production process en
vironment. The initial phase of the
investigation focused on a com
parison of the company’s two
plants to industry averages at the
four-digit Standard Industrial Clas
sification code level.* In order to
take advantage of the available
methodology and published data
*Federal classification.

. . . since expected increased demand was not realized. Productivity per worker declined sharply.
24
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EXHIBIT I

PRODUCTIVITY INDEX (output per all-employee man hour)
Comparison of 7 and 5-Year Average Annual Trends

A and B PLANTS vs. INDUSTRY
1958-1964

on productivity, output per man
hour was used to compare to the
industry averages published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Exhibit 1, this page, graphically
portrays the results of this anal
ysis. As a basis for comparison of
both Plant A and Plant B trends,
productivity ratios were devel
oped for two distinct time periods,
1958 through 1964 and 1965
through 1969, the latter time frame
to take account of the startup of
Plant B in 1965.
As presented, the average an
nual trend for this early period
showed Plant A gaining at a rate
of 3.7 per cent, which is substan
tially higher than the industry
average for this period. The trend
for the 1965 through 1969 period
showed a markedly different rate
for Plant A, namely, a decline of
January-February, 1974

1965-1969

—3.3 per cent compared to a neg
ative 0.8 per cent trend for the in
dustry. Plant B, on the other hand,
showed a significant positive trend
of 5.0 per cent. This experience for
Plant B was not surprising since
the plant was constructed more re
cently with substantially greater
emphasis on automation and im
proved plant layout relative to
Plant A.
Two distinct phases

The trends for the operation of
Plant A indicate that there were,
in fact, two distinct productivity
averages: a period to the mid-six
ties in which productivity rose at
a rate substantially higher than
the industry, and a second period,
since the mid-sixties, in which pro

ductivity declined more rapidly
than the industry. These trends
were particularly surprising since,
in most recent years, the company
had experienced increasing levels
of sales growth. Further compari
sons of the company’s plants-toindustry statistics showed that la
bor compensation had increased
substantially faster than the inGRANVILLE R. GARGIULO
is a principal in the ad
ministrative services divi
sion of the New York
office of Arthur Ander
sen & Co. He is also the
firm's director of techni
cal competence in opera
tions research. Mr. Gar
giulo is an adjunct pro
fessor at the Fordham University School of
Business Administration. He has held positions
with Kollsman Instrument Corporation, Chas.
Pfizer & Co., and System Development Cor
poration. His articles have appeared in this
and other professional publications.

25

EXHIBIT 2

PRODUCTIVITY
INDEX

PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS
(output per production worker man hour)

dustry average with a resulting in
crease for the company in unit la
bor costs relative to competition.
The unfavorable productivity
trend at Plant A led to a detailed
cost center analysis in a raw ma
terial processing operation and the
Finishing & Packaging Department
of both Plants A and B in an at
tempt to isolate the causal factors
contributing to the significant dif
ferences in performance. The pro
ductivity trends for the Raw Ma
terial I processing areas at Plants
26

A and B are illustrated in Exhibit
2, above, for the period of anal
ysis, 1958 through 1971. As shown,
the productivity index for Plant A
reached a high point in 1961 and
output per man-hour declined
steadily ever since. On the average,
for the entire period, the trend had
been a 2.0 per cent decline. Plant
B, on the other hand, had an an
nual improvement of 5.1 per cent
for the period 1966 through 1971.
Plant A’s trend for this more re
cent period was 2.0 per cent, the

same as for the entire period 1958
through 1971.
The relationship between changes
in total output and labor hours is
illustrated in Exhibit 3, page 27.
The high point in productivity
trend in 1961 relates directly to the
data for that year in terms of hours
and output. More specifically, the
area between the “labor hours” line
and “pounds produced” line was at
its smallest in that year. The sub
sequent increase in the area be
tween these lines in later years reManagement Adviser

. . . while demand for raw material dropped, no review of operating needs was made . . .

fleets the steady decline in produc
tivity. This expansion resulted
from the addition, between 1961
and 1964, of the equivalent of 12
people in various departments
comprising the Raw Material I
processing area of Plant A.
Attempts were made by the com
pany to identify the causes of this
increase in personnel. However,
neither operating management nor
accounting records could identify
a change in operating require

ments, cleanup, etc., which might
account for this drastic change in
the area’s basic labor complement.
While there were a few minor
changes in the operation, the asso
ciated increases or decreases in
labor seem to cancel themselves
out and could not account for the
increase of 12 people. The phe
nomenon is even more interesting
since, once the expansion in work
force had taken place, the relation
ship between hours and output re-

mained fairly constant, i.e., the
labor line moves relatively parallel
to the output line.
In general, it appeared that ad
ditional labor was added to the
area in the early sixties in antici
pation of increased demand. While
demand for intermediate raw ma
terial dropped significantly in later
years as a result of reductions in
raw material content of the finished
goods, no review of the operating
requirements of the area was made

EXHIBIT 3

Millions
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TOTAL OUTPUT AND LABOR HOURS

Thousands
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EXHIBIT 4

Thousands
of

RAW MATERIAL I PROCESSING AREA
ACTUAL LABOR HOURS vs. ESTIMATED LABOR HOURS

to reduce the labor complement
accordingly. The impact of this
failure to adjust the labor content is
placed in some perspective by Ex
hibit 4, above. An analysis of out
put per hour for selected periods
was made and the highest quar
terly level of output per hour dur
ing 1961 was determined. Actual
output for each year was then
divided by this quarterly value of
output per hour to develop an esti
mate of labor hours which would
have been required to produce the
actual output if the area’s 1961 out
put per hour level had been main
tained. Exhibit 4 shows the signi
ficant differences between actual
hours and the estimated hours at
1961’s demonstrated efficiency lev
els. The differences in estimated
28

and actual hours was then ex
tended by the average plant labor
rates in each year to estimate the
cost of this excess labor. On aver
age, this represents approximately
$150,000 per year.
Similar productivity comparisons
were developed for the Finishing
& Packaging areas at both plants.
The relative comparisons between
Plant A and Plant B showed Plant
A productivity trending upward at
a gradual rate of 3.5 per cent per
year, which reflected the introduc
tion of automated equipment over
a 12-year span. Plant B, on the
other hand, was opened in 1965
and its Finishing & Packaging op
eration fully automated within
several years thereafter. Conse
quently, the productivity improve

ment at Plant B was 20 per cent
per year.
Exhibit 5, page 29, provides fur
ther detail on the relationship be
tween output and labor hours for
the Finishing & Packaging area at
Plant A. As is clearly illustrated,
the record of continued produc
tivity improvement through 1971
was the result of fairly steady in
creases in output with drastic re
ductions in the levels of labor in
put required. As mentioned ear
lier, this was largely the result of
the introduction of automatic fin
ishing and packaging equipment.
Not surprisingly, as shown on the
insert graph, particularly high lev
els of productivity were achieved
in those years which corresponded
to the periods in which various
Management Adviser

. . . particularly high productivity was achieved when automated lines became operational . . .

automated lines became opera
tional, specifically 1958-59, 196365, and 1969-70. It is also of some
interest to note that the impact on
productivity resulting from these
installations moved in a lag of
about one year from the actual in
troduction of the new equipment,
reflecting the natural learning
curve, and the startup problems
associated with new equipment.
What can we conclude?

This case study described pro
vides ample evidence that one par

ticular element of a company’s his
torical performance which has a
more gradual impact on profitabil
ity is productivity. If so much of
the value of financial planning and
the effectiveness of financial mod
els to facilitate planning is based
on a proper reflection and under
standing of historical interrelation
ships, then management must have
considerably greater insight into
the factors contributing to produc
tivity performance. The methodol
ogy of productivity measurement
and comparison at the company or

plant level provides initial insight
into the factors at work which af
fect profitability, both past and in
the future. Detailed productivity
analysis of major or key operations
of a business reveals how specific
decisions in the past impact pro
ductivity and profitability and,
thus, pave the way for judging
the reasonableness of building such
impacts into the logic of a plan
ning model and/or assumptions
about the future. Without produc
tivity analysis, the validity of the
model, and even perhaps the plan
ning process, may be suspect.

EXHIBIT 5

—
MiIlions

January-February, 1974

TOTAL OUTPUT AND LABOR HOURS
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